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RECENT CASES
threatened with large damage suits. Section 1983 suits and disciplinary
proceedings are other options available to indigents who wish to pursue
judicial remedies against their court-appointed attorneys, but these options
present difficulties which lessen their attractiveness when compared with
malpractice suits. The floodgates may have been opened, but the dam
stands firm.
ALExANDa D. Toz&AsZCZUK
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: APPLICATION OF
MISSOURI'S 1978 SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
LEGISLATION TO SCHOOL DISTRICTS
Beiser v. Parkway School District'
On May 28, 1976, Beiser, a student attending Parkway South Junior
High School, lost his right eye as the result of an accident in an industrial
arts class. As a fellow student attempted to insert a drill bit into a drill
press, the drill bit flew from the press and struck Beiser in the eye. Beiser
sued the school district,2 which had a liability insurance policy that ap-
parently covered the accident, alleging that his injuries were the result of
the school district's negligence.
The circuit court granted the school district's motion to dismiss on
the ground of the sovereign immunity doctrine.3 In affirming the circuit
court's dismissal of the suit,4 the Missouri Supreme Court held that a
1. 589 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
2. A school district is a public corporation and service of process thereon is
provided for by RSMo § 506.150(5) (1978). The opinion does not specify what
plaintiff's theory of negligence would have been had he survived the motion for
summary judgment.
3. 589 S.W.2d at 278. Sovereign immunity is that protection afforded state
and local governmental bodies from responsibility for their tortious conduct. See
generally W. Paossa., HANDBoox op Tm LAw op TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971); Bor-
chard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Borchard, Gov-
ernmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926); Leflar & Kantrowitz,
Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1363 (1954); Comment, Judicial
Abrogation of Governmental and Sovereign Immunity: A National Trend with
a Pennsylvania Perspective, 78 DicK. L. Rav. 365 (1973). The general rule in
Missouri and in this country was that a school district was not, in the absence
of a statute imposing it, subject to liability for injuries to pupils suffered in con-
nection with their attendance at public schools, since the district in maintaining
schools acts as an agent for the state and performs a purely public or govern-
mental function imposed on it by law for the benefit of the public. See Gold v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 137 Md. 335, 335, 112 A. 588, 588 (1921); Todd v. Curators
of Univ. of Mo., 347 Mo. 460, 461, 147 S.W.2d 1063, 1064 (1940); Annot., 9 A.L.R.
911, 911 (1920).
4. This case was transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court by the St. Louis
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school district is not a municipality within the meaning of Missouri Re-
vised Statutes section 71.185, which provides that a municipality waives its
defense of sovereign immunity for torts committed while exercising a gov-
ernmental function if and to the extent the municipality carries liability
insurance.5
The decision in Beiser, although labeled a resolution of an apparent
conflict in the decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court concerning the
meaning to be given the term "municipality," 6 was not unpredictable. The
Beiser court conceded, as do substantially all jurisdictions and contempo-
rary writers,7 that in the ordinarily accepted sense the term "municipality"
now has a broader meaning than merely a city or town. For some purposes
the term includes bodies that are public or essentially governmental in
character and function.8 Indeed, school districts have been referred to as
munidpalities, 9 municipal corporations,' 0 public corporations,"1 or quasi
corporations.' 2
The Beiser court noted, however, that the meaning to be given a
word or phrase in a particular statute ultimately depends upon the as-
certained intent of the legislature. 18 This intent is often expressly provided
in statutes,14 but where it is not, as with section 71.185, it must be deter-
5. 589 S.W.2d at 281. RSMo § 71.185.1 (1978) provides:
Any municipality engaged in the exercise of governmental functions may
carry liability insurance and pay the premiums therefor to insure such
muncipality... against claims or causes of actions for... personal in-
juries, .. . caused while in the exercise of the governmental functions,
and shall be liable as in other cases of torts for ... personal injres...
suffered by third persons while the municipality is engaged in the exercise
of the governmental functions to the extent of the insurance so carried.
6. 589 S.W.2d at 278.
7. See 1 E. MCQUILLIN, MuNICnPAL COR'ORATIONS §§ 2.03-.03b (3d ed. 1971);
Noel, Municipal Tort Immunity in Police Misconduct Litigation: The Case for
Judicial Abrogation in Missouri, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 602, 605 (1974); 62 C.J.S.
Municipal Corporations § 1, at 64 (1949).
8. See St. Louis Hous. Auth. v. City of St. Louis, 361 Mo. 1170, 1178, 239
S.W.2d 289, 294 (1951) (statute authorizing municipalities to cooperate with each
other in planning public improvements also encompasses Housing Authority);
Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210, 218-19, 229 S.W. 1050, 1052 (1921) (maintaining
free public schools is a governmental function).
9. See Curry v. District Township, 62 Iowa 102, 104, 17 N.W. 191, 192
(1883) (school district was a municipality for purpose of issuing bonds).
10. Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 853, 146 N.W.2d 626, 633 (1966).
11. Prewitt v. Parkway School Dist., 557 S.W.2d 232, 232 (Mo. En Banc
1977); State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. v. Powell, 359 Mo. 321, 323, 221
S.W.2d 508, 509 (1949); United Accounts, Inc. v. Dachtler, 100 N.W.2d 93, 94
(N.D. 1959).
12. Community Fire Protection Dist. v. Board of Educ., 315 S.W.2d 873, 877
(Mo. App., St. L. 1958).
13. 589 S.W.2d at 280. See State ex rel. Conservation Comm n v. LePage,
566 S.W.2d 208, 212 (Mo. En Banc 1978) (court interpreting a state sales tax
provision).
14. The Missouri General Assembly specifically expressed that school dis-
tricts are included in the scope of RSMo § 70.210(2) (1978) (allowing political
subdivisions to contract and cooperate with each other for production, acquisition,
or operation of public facilities or for common service). The Missouri General
[Vol. 45
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mined from the context in which the word or phrase is used.15 Section
71.185 provides for a limited waiver of a municipality's immunity from
tort liability. Statutes waiving the immunity of the sovereign, however,
have been required by the Missouri Supreme Court to be construed strict-
ly.16 Therefore, the court in Beiser declared that it was compelled to fol-
low City of Olivette v. Graeler,17 a 1960 decision holding that in its strict
and primary sense the term "municipality" applies only to incorporated
cities, towns, and villages having subordinate and local powers of legisla-
tion.' 8
The significance of Beiser is not the manner in which the Missouri Su-
preme Court interpreted and applied section 71.185, but rather its implica-
tions regarding future school district immunity in tort under Missouri's 1978
sovereign immunity legislation.19 Although not applicable to the facts in
Beiser,2 0 the 1978 legislation reinstated the common law doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity in which, with only a few limited exceptions, public en-
tities2 ' and political subdivisions2 2 would be liable in tort.
A future interpretation of the sovereign immunity legislation could
Assembly has specifically excluded school districts from the reach of RSMo §
70.600(19) (1978) (dealing with retiring or pensioning of officers or employees
of political subdivisions).
15. Although not expressly provided, school districts have been included in
RSMo §§ 70.120(3) (1978) (rural resettlement or rehabilitation agreements) and
506.150(5) (1978) (commencement of suit and service process). See State ex tel.
Consolidated School Dist. v. Powell, 359 Mo. 321, 324, 221 S.W.2d 508, 510 (1949)
(school districts funds belonging to teachers' fund constituted trust fund for
purposes provided by statute).
16. See Charles v. Spradling, 524 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. En Banc 1975);
Kleban v. Morris, 363 Mo. 7, 15, 247 S.W.2d 832, 837 (1952). Both were actions
against the state for tax refunds. Such suits cannot be maintained without the
state's permission, and statutes thus waiving sovereign immunity are strictly con-
strued.
17. 338 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. 1960).
18. The City of Olivette was held to be included within an annexation
statute because it had legislative powers. Id. at 835. See also Page v. Metropolitan
St. Louis Sewer Dist., 377 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Mo. 1964) (sewer district did not pos-
sess the requisite powers of a municipality so as to permit suit in negligence
against it); Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309, 311 (1873) (school district not a
municipality within nepotism statute).
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that the provision waiving
sovereign immunity in Beiser, RSMo § 71.185 (1969) (now RSMo § 71.185 (1978)),
appears in a chapter of the Missouri statutes dealing specifically with cities, towns,
and villages. RSMo ch. 71 (1969) (now RSMo ch. 71 (1978)).
19. Missouri's General Assembly enacted a comprehensive sovereign im-
munity statute in RSMo §§ 537.600-.650 (1978).
20. The cause of action in Beiser arose in 1976; the new sovereign immunity
legislation went into effect in 1978.
21. See notes 45-49 and accompanying text infra. The level of responsibility
placed on governmental entities in Missouri for their torts is more restrictive than
in a majority of the jurisdictions in the United States. See Harly & Wasinger,
Governmental Immunity: Despotic Mantle or Creature of Necessity, 16 WAsnMMN
L.J. 12 (1976); Kerwin, Tort Liability for Illinois Schools Under Section 9-103
of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 25 DE PAul L. RFv. 441 (1976); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) Or Topus §§ 20-21 (1966).
22. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text infra.
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repeat the Beiser result. Applying the Beiser analysis to the statute sug-
gests the possibility that a plaintiff injured by a school district that has a
liability insurance policy, as provided in the statute, may be denied re-
covery because the tortfeasor school district might not have waived its
sovereign immunity by carrying insurance. Contrary to the Beiser analy-
sis, the weight of authority in Missouri and in the majority of jurisdictions
would support a decision to apply the immunity and all the exceptions of
this legislation to school districts, i.e., a school district would waive its
sovereign immunity status to the extent of its liability insurance coverage.
To appreciate Beiser's impact on the doctrine of sovereign immunity
as it exists today in Missouri Revised Statutes section 537.600,28 one must
first consider the adoption, evolution,2 4 and implementation of the doc-
trine in Missouri.2 5 Decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court afforded
municipalities,26 as well as school districts, 2 7 immunity from tort suits.
23. RSMo § 537.600 (1978) provides:
Such sovereign . . . immunity as existed at common law in this state
prior to September 12, 1977, except to the extent waived, abrogated or
modified by statutes in effect prior to that date, shall remain in full
force and effect; except that, the immunity of the public entity from
liability and suit for compensatory damages for negligent acts or omis-
sions is hereby expressly waived in the following instances: (1) Injuries
directly resulting from the negligent acts or omissions by public employees
arising out of the operations of motor vehicles within the course of their
employment; (2) Injuries caused by the condition of a public entity's
property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous
condition ... , that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous con-
dition, that the dangerous condition breated a reasonably foreseeable risk
of harm ... , and that either a negligent or wrongful act or omission of
an employee of the public entity . . . created the dangerous condition
or a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous
condition ....
24. Sovereign immunity of federal and state governments traces its origins
to two maxims of English common law: (1) the King cannot be sued in his own
courts, a procedural bar; and (2) the King can do no wrong, a substantive bar.
See generally Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALr L.J. 1 (1924);
Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 Mum. L. Rxv. 751 (1956). These
principles were applied to local governments and governmental units in England.
Russel v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667, 668, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 360 (1778)(action not allowed against an unincorporated county for negligent maintenance
of bridge). In 1812 municipalities in the United States were afforded this pro-
tection for the first time. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 249 (1812)
(no liability for municipality's negligent maintenance of public road).
25. For a detailed analysis of the development of this doctrine in Missouri
and elsewhere, see Lauer, Municipal Law in Missouri, 28 Mo. L. Rv. 555, 572-75(1963); Littlefield, Stare Decisis, Prospective Overruling, and Judicial Legislation
in the Context of Sovereign Immunity, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 56, 60-75 (1964); Com-
ment, Torts-Municipal Corporations-Municipal "Governmental" Tort Immunity
Doctrine in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. Rx-v. 224, 225-27 (1962).
26. Reardon v. St. Louis County, 36 Mo. 555, 562 (1865) (county afforded
protection of sovereign immunity); City of St. Louis v. Gurno, 12 Mo. 414, 423
(1849) (city afforded protection of sovereign immunity).
27. Cochran v. Wilson, 287 Mo. 210, 219, 229 S.W. 1050, 1053-54 (1921)(school districts when engaged in the performance of governmental functions are
instrumentalities of the state and thus subject to the same rules of immunity for
negligence as the state).
[Vol. 45
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Criticism and dissatisfaction with the doctrine developed, and the numer-
ous justifications proffered in its support did little to quash the growing
dissatisfaction. 28 The result has been a contemporary trend throughout
the United States to modify or abolish sovereign immunity.29 Despite this
trend, the Missouri Supreme Court pronounced in 1972 that "[t]he Mis-
souri Constitution and statutes are silent on the matter of sovereign im-
munity but the judicial decisions of this court have declared in no uncer-
tain terms that this doctrine is the public policy of this state." 30 The court
further suggested that the imposition of tort liability upon governmental
entities such as school districts, heretofore unknown to the laws of this
state, must be a creation of the legislature.3 '
O'Dell v. School DistrictS2 was the last case that judicially retained
sovereign immunity in Missouri. There the supreme court determined that
sovereign immunity was a legislatively made doctrine3 s in Missouri. 4
Further, the court saw the legislature's activity regarding sovereign im-
munity as showing an intent to retain the doctrine.3 5 Thus, the Missouri
28. See Littlefield, supra note 25, at 81; Noel, supra note 7, at 606; Comment,
The State as a Party Defendant: Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity in Tort in
Maryland, 36 MD. L. REv. 653 (1977). The Missouri Supreme Court even indi-
cated its dissatisfaction with the doctrine. In Cullor v. Jackson Township, 249
S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1952), the court recognized and agreed with the reforms to
sovereign immunity that were occurring in the United States, but refused to ju-
dicially alter or abolish it. Id. at 397.
29. This has been accomplished by judicial action in 33 states. See K. DAVIS,
ADmIISnnATIVE LAW oF Tfm SEvENTmS §§ 25.00-.11 (2d ed. Supp. 1978); Harly &
Wasinger, supra note 21. Some of the more notable cases exemplifying this action
are Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Flournoy v. School Dist.
No. 1, 174 Colo. 110, 482 P.2d 966 (1971); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96
So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18
Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Carroll v.
Kittle, 203 Kan. 841, 457 P.2d 21 (1969); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich.
231, Ill N.W.2d 1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264
Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Johnson v. Municipal Univ., 184 Neb. 512,
169 N.W.2d 286 (1969).
30. Payne v. County of Jackson, 484 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Mo. 1972) (vrongful
death action against county dismissed because of defendant's sovereign immun-
ity). For similar holdings, see Wood v. County of Jackson, 463 S.W.2d 834, 835
(Mo. 1971); Clark v. Adair County, 79 Mo. 536, 537 (1883).
31. Payne v. County of Jackson, 484 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Mo. 1972). The Mis-
souri Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to re-examine or modify the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. See Watson v. Kansas City, 499 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Mo. En
Banc 1973). See generally articles cited note 25 supra.
32. 521 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. En Banc) (action against school district by student
for injuries sustained while practicing wrestling), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975).
33. Only a minority of jurisdictions have found sovereign immunity to be
a legislatively made doctrine. See Harly & Wasinger, supra note 21, at 43; Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 369.
34. O'Dell v. School Dist., 521 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Mo. En Banc), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 865 (1975). This was true, the court reasoned, because the Missouri leg-
islature enacted RSMo § 1.010 (1978), which adopted the English common law,
including the sovereign immunity doctrine.
35. On several occasions the Missouri legislature had acted to limit the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in specific areas without abolishing the doctrine en-
1980]
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Supreme Court reaffirmed its position of refusing to judicially modify
or abolish sovereign immunity.
In 1977 the Missouri Supreme Court overruled its longstanding po-
sition on sovereign immunity. In Jones v. State Highway Commission,3 6
the court held that sovereign immunity from tort liability was no longer
to be837 a bar to claims against various instrumentalities of the state.8 8 A
companion case specifically applied this holding to school districts.8 9 The
court completely rejected the justifications previously offered in support
of the doctrine40 and chose not to follow extensive judicial precedent which
had deferred the responsibility to act in this area to the legislature.-" Fur-
ther, the Jones court found no legislative intent favoring the retention of
this doctrine expressed in any legislation concerning sovereign immunity.42
tirely. See RSMo §§ 34.260-.275 (1978) (authorizing the purchase of liability in-
surance for state motor vehicles); RSMo § 71.185 (1978) (providing for suits
against a municipality obtaining liability insurance); RSMo §§ 105.800-.850 (1978)(extending liability to provisions of workmen's compensation); RSMo § 226.092(1978) (authorizing state highway commission to provide insurance for their em-
ployees' potential liability). All these except for § 71.185 specifically include pro-
visions that caution against construing the statute as a waiver of sovereign in.
munity.
36. 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. En Banc 1977) (driver sought damages for personal
injuries suffered from accident on public highway).
37. Most judicial modifications or abrogations of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity have been prospective. This allows for legislative and public reaction
and adjustment to such a declaration. See Torts-Abrogation of Sovereign Immun-
ity-Scope of Retained Immunity, 43 Mo. L. R.mv. 387, 389 n.14 (1978).
38. Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. En Banc
1977).
39. Prewitt v. Parkway School Dist., 557 S.W.2d 232, 232 (Mo. En Banc
1977) (allowed suit against school district for negligent maintenance of hallway
floors).
40. The court in Jones adopted the position advocated by Judge Finch in
his dissenting opinion in O'Dell v. School Dist., 521 S.W.2d 403, 409 (Mo. En
Banc) (Finch, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975). In so doing, sixjustifications for sovereign immunity were specifically rejected. First, the court
discounted the argument that a suit against the government would result in con-
fusion and inconvenience since no funds would be available to satisfy a judgment.
Second, it' totally rejected the idea that it was better for the private individual to
bear the loss than for the public to absorb it. Third, the English maxim that the
King could do no wrong is inapplicable to present governmental entities. Fourth,
the court noted that there existed no empirical support for the argument that
respondeat superior would allow for the dissipation of public funds. Fifth, the
trust fund theory was found to rest on illogical grounds. Sixth, the crippling ex-
pense argument lacked empirical support and notwithstanding this, it was proper
for the government to pay for its torts. Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557
S.W.2d 225, 228-29 (Mo. En Banc 1977). For other jurisdictions rejecting similar
policy justifications, see Comment, supra note 28, at 658-68.
41. See Smith v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 2, 408 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Mo.
En Banc 1966) (action against school district for personal injuries barred because
of district's sovereign immunity).
42. The court noted that no comprehensive legislation dealing with sovereign
immunity had been enacted. This lack of legislative initiative was viewed by the
court as a legislative recognition of the desirability of providing some relief from
the hardships and inequities of the doctrine. 557 S.W.2d at 229.
[Vol. 45
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Therefore, with regard to governmental immunity, Jones decided that the
rule in Missouri is liability; the exception is immunity.4
The legislative response that quickly followed Jones dearly indicated
that the Missouri Supreme Court had misperceived the legislature's po-
sition on sovereign immunity. As was done in a number of jurisdictions
subsequent to an initial judicial abolition of the doctrine,44 the Missouri
legislature specifically and completely reinstated sovereign immunity "as
it existed at common law" prior to Jones.4 5 Thus, once again school dis-
tricts, as instrumentalities created by the legislature for the purpose of
and engaged in the performance of governmental functions, appeared to
be protected from liability for negligence just as the state was.46
Missouri's sovereign immunity legislation adds two limited exceptions
(areas of liability) to its general grant of immunity to "public entities."47
The first exception imposes liability on all "public entities" in the state
for the negligent operation of motor vehicles by public employees within
the scope of their employment.4 8 The second exception makes all "public
entities" liable for "injuries caused by the dangerous conditions of a pub-
lic entity's property" if the plaintiff establishes certain specific require-
ments.49
43. Id. at 230. A nearly identical rule was declared in Holytz v. City of Mil-
waukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962) (court allowed action for
personal injuries from loose water meter trap door in park). Jones did, however,
reserve some immunity for governmental entities. This decision was not meant to
impose liability upon the state or any of its agencies for acts or omissions constitut-
ing the exercise of legislative, judicial, or executive functions. 557 S.W.2d at 230.
44. Many state legislatures subsequently reinstated some altered or modified
form of sovereign immunity after such judicial action. The following are some
illustrative examples: ARr. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-
108 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 10-101 (Smith-Hurd 1966 & Supp.
Pamphlet 1980-1981); KANJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-8401 to -8417 (1972); Micr. COMI.
LAws ANN. §§ 691.1401-.1415 (1968 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); NEB. Rnv. STAT.
§ 23-2401 (1977). Some legislatures chose to follow the judicial lead and abrogate
governmental immunity statutorily. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West Supp.
1976). For further discussion and citations, see generally Alstyne, Governmental
Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919; Harly & Wasinger,
supra note 21.
45. The statute's relevant portions are set out in note 23 supra. The statute's
clear and succinct language on reinstatement leaves little question as to the legis-
lative position regarding this doctrine. The legislative actions here, however, do
not affect RSMo § 71.185 (1978). This statute is still good law, although its im-
portance is significantly lessened by the enactment of Missouri's broader 1978
sovereign immunity legislation.
46. See Rennie v. Belleview School Dist., 521 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Mo. En Banc
1975) (action against school district for the death of student who was killed on
playground while playing on swing barred because of sovereign immunity); Dick
v. Board of Educ., 238 S.W. 1073, 1074 (Mo. 1922) (school district not liable for
injuries to pupil from its motor truck).
47. RSMo § 537.600 (1978). Most states enacting sovereign immunity legis-
lation provide exceptions, but these differ specifically from state to state. See,
e.g., statutes cited note 44 supra.
48. RSMo § 537.600(1) (1978).
49. RSMo § 537.600(2) (1978).
1980]
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There is no foreseeable bar to a claimant maintaining a negligence
suit against a school district after establishing the prerequisite conditions
of these exceptions because it is universally agreed that the term "public
entity" includes school districts.50 These exceptions, however, contain a
number of detailed conditions that a claimant must establish before he
may recover from a public entity,51 i.e., school district. Thus, these ex-
ceptions are not readily available to claimants like the plaintiff in Beiser.
Additionally, but of no import in a factual situation similar to Beiser,
these exceptions to the entity's immunity are expressly limited to "neg-
ligent acts or omissions," apparently excluding intentional torts.
5 2
Missouri's sovereign immunity legislation also provides in Missouri
Revised Statutes section 537.610.153 that each "political subdivision" may
purchase liability insurance to cover tort claims made against it. A number
of states authorize such discretionary protection from potential claims. 54
Under these statutes, it is generally found that where the political subdi-
vision elects to insure itself against liability in tort, that subdivision waives
its immunity to the extent of any insurance purchased and to that extent
places itself on the same basis as all other tort defendants.55 The Missouri
legislature apparently intended to provide machinery by which a "po-
litical subdivision" could protect itself from tort judgments. This is true
in those cases where the subdivision may now be liable, i.e., section 537.600,
and where immunity was retained but waived for the purposes and amounts
of liability insurance purchased pursuant to section 537.610.1.
50. See Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 758 (1971); Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 703 (1970).
51. RSMo § 537.600 (1978). The burden on a plaintiff here is especially de-
manding. The plaintiff has to establish the statutorily required condition(s),
act(s), knowledge, and notice before sovereign immunity will be waived.
52. RSMo § 537.610.2 (1978), also applies to injuries resulting from public
properties, as a result of "a negligent or wrongful act or omission."
53. RSMo § 537.610.1 (1978), provides in part:
[T]he governing body of each political subdivision of this state, not-
withstanding any other provision of law, may purchase liability insurance
for tort claims made against the state or the political subdivision, but the
maximum amount of such coverage shall not exceed eight hundred
thousand dollars for all claims arising out of a single occurrence and
shall not exceed one hundred thousand dollars for any one person in a
single accident or occurrence ... and no amount in excess of the above
limits shall be awarded or settled upon. Sovereign immunity for the state
of Missouri and its political subdivisions is waived only to the maximum
amount of and only for the purposes covered by such policy of insurance
purchased pursuant to the provisions of this section ....
54, For extensive citations, see Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sov-
ereign Without Immunity, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 161 (1963); Mancke, Liability of
School Districts for the Negligent Acts of Their Employees, 1 J.L. & EDuc. 109, 113
n.34 (1972). For a discussion and citations on the constitutionality of statutes
authorizing governmental units to procure liability insurance, see Annot., 71
A.L.R.3d 6, 21 (1976).
55. This is found either expressly, as RSMo § 537.610.1 (1978) provides, or
by judicial interpretation, as in Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 51 M1I. 2d 274,
281-82, 281 N.E.2d 659, 664 (1972) (immunity granted by statute waived by op-
eration of law when liability insurance purchased pursuant to statute).
[Vol. 45
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss4/11
RECENT CASES
Most jurisdictions include school districts within the term "political
subdivision."56 Further, most legislation in other states concerning sovereign
immunity, and the waiver of it, use this term and either expressly or by
judicial interpretation include school districts. 57 Case law in Missouri has
generally adhered to this position, 58 and some Missouri legislation ex-
pressly states it.59 Indeed, the Missouri Supreme Court has on a number
of occasions refused to impose liability in tort on school districts by as-
serting the doctrine of sovereign immunity for these "political subdivi-
sions." 0
These authorities, however, are not completely dispositive on the
question of a school district's inclusion in the term "political subdivision"
for the purpose of section 537.610.1. These Missouri decisions directly
decided only whether the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity ap-
plied to school districts; they did not decide whether school districts were
in fact "political subdivisions" of the state. In addition, Missouri courts often
have held specifically that school districts are not "political subdivisions"
of the state for the purpose of various articles of the Missouri Constitu-
tion.6 1 The significance of this distinction is that, when considered to-
gether with the language of the section and the principles of statutory
construction Beiser employs, it is quite possible that school districts may
be excluded from the scope of this section.
If the legislature intended that all governmental units be covered by
section 537.610, its utility would be hampered by the language used in it.
Beiser stands for the proposition that each phrase of a statute should be
interpreted within the context of the specific law and that those statutes
waiving the immunity of the sovereign should be construed strictly.62 Other
cases have suggested that statutes which would modify so fundamental a
rule of common law as sovereign immunity must be clear in their expres-
56. For cases holding that school districts were political subdivisions, see
Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 227 Ga. 1, 8, 178 S.E.2d 868, 874(1970); Laing v. School Dist. No. 10, 190 Or. 358, 375, 224 P.2d 923, 930 (1950).
57. See statutes cited note 44 supra. See also Mancke, supra note 54, at 114.
58. For Missouri cases holding that school districts were political subdivisions,
see O'Dell v. School Dist., 521 S.W.2d 403, 404 (Mo. En Banc), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 865 (1975); Smith v. Consolidated School Dist. No. 2, 408 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Mo.
En Banc 1966); State ex rel. McKittrock v. Whittle, 333 Mo. 705, 709, 63 S.W.2d
100, 102 (En Banc 1933).
59. A definitional section in RSMo § 70.210(2) (1978), expressly provides
that school districts are political subdivisions, while a definitional section in
RSMo § 70.600(19) (1978), expressly provides that school districts are not political
subdivisions for the purposes of its provisions.
60. See cases cited note 58 supra.
61. Lakewood Park Cemetery Ass'n v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist.,
396 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Mo. App., St. L. 1965) (school district not a political sub-
division of the state within Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 3 (1945, amended 1976)); State
ex rel. Dahm v. Goodin, 295 S.W.2d 600, 603 (Mo. App., K.C. 1956) (school dis-
trict not a political subdivision of the state within Mo. CONST. art. V, § 4 (1945,
amended 1976)).
62. 589 S.W.2d at 280. See also 24 Mo. Att'y Gen. Op. 394 (Nov. 2, 1967).
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sion of such intent. 3 No intention to modify the rule can be supported
by mere implication; if ambiguous, the statute must be construed against
modification of the rule.6 4 If this reasoning is followed, school districts
would be precluded from utilizing section 537.610.1 because the courts
would not infer a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Proponents of a more contemporary line of reasoning, however, assert
that despite the strict construction requirement, statutes waiving sovereign
immunity must not be interpreted so as to lead to absurd results.65 The
Missouri Supreme Court itself stated that the limits of sovereign immunity
for torts should be confined within reasonable grounds.6 6 A result in which
a plaintiff's recovery is barred despite liability insurance purchased by a
political subdivision, i.e., a school district, which has the authority and
desire to collect and spend public monies for such insurance, is clearly
absurd. A legislature enacting a comprehensive sovereign immunity statute
surely would not intend such a result.
Beiser indicates that the Missouri Supreme Court may not follow
this contemporary line of reasoning. In rejecting a reasonably supportable
position that the term "municipality" did include school districts for the
purpose of section 71.185,67 the court in Beiser took a definite, position
against making broad inferences on legislative intent concerning sovereign
immunity. This policy of construction was reflected by the court's reason-
ing that because school districts had not been expressly provided for in the
language of section 71.185 and because existing case law had not unequiv-
ocally held that school districts were municipalities, this statute could not
63. See, e.g., Hummer v. School City, 124 Ind. App. 30, 48-49, 112 N.E.2d
891, 900 (1953). In this case, the school district had purchased liability insurance
pursuant to a statute similar to RSMo §§ 71.185, 537.610.1 (1978). It was held
that the school district had not waived its sovereign immunity 'by purchasing
liability insurance pursuant to statute. It was further held that the statute was
too vague to allow a modification of a common law principle. This holding was
overruled in Flowers v. Board of Comm'rs, 240 Ind. 668, 676, 168 N.E.2d 224,
227-28 (1960), where the court determined that the statute was sufficiently dear
to allow the modification.
64. Hummer v. School City, 124 Ind. App. 30, 48-49, 112 N.E.2d 891, 900
(1953).
65. See Phelps v. Department of State Highways, 75 Mich. App. 442, 445,
254 N.W.2d 923, 925 (1977) (plaintiff not barred from maintaining negligence
suit simply because defendant did not receive notice within 120 days).
66. Dallas v. City of St. Louis, 338 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Mo. 1960) (wrongful
death action against city-owned garage allowed because this was not governmental
function). Additionally, statutes affecting the organizations, functions, and powers
of school district organizations are to be construed liberally. Reorganized School
Dist. No. R-IV v. Williams, 289 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Mo. App., K.C. 1956).
67. See notes 7-12 and accompanying text supra. Chief Justice Bardgett's
dissenting opinion in Beiser accepted the position that a school district, being a
municipal corporation, could utilize RSMo § 71.185 (1978), and thereby waive
its sovereign immunity. He opined that a broad interpretation should be given
to the statute so that the school district and the public would get the full benefit
of expenditures of the public funds for insurance. He argued that treating the
school district as a municipality would not impose liability which was not fore-
seen and agreed to by the district. 589 S.W.2d at 281 (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting).
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modify the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity relating to them.
If this reasoning is applied to a future interpretation of section 537.610.1,
the results again may be that school districts will have wasted expendi-
tures on liability insurance that can never be called upon for payment,
insurers will have been allowed this windfall, and plaintiffs will be denied
recovery under these policies because the school district was not authorized
to waive its sovereign immunity in this manner. A school district's only
liability would be that provided in section 537.600.
Missouri, along with most other jurisdictions, imposes a statutory
limit on recovery when a claimant establishes liability68 under any sover-
eign immunity exception. 69 In Missouri, this is true whether the exception
is statutorily provided in section 537.600 or as a result of purchasing lia-
bility insurance pursuant to section 537.610.1. Missouri's limit is eight
hundred thousand dollars for all claims70 arising out of a single accident
or occurrence and one hundred thousand dollars for any one person in a
single accident or occurrence. 71 This limit is applied whether or not lia-
bility insurance is present and regardless of whether coverage exceeds the
statutory ceiling. Additionally, the school district probably could assert
this limit after a verdict was rendered to have the court reduce any award
to a sum equal to the limit.72 There would be, therefore, no incentive or
rationale for a school district to purchase liability coverage above this
amount; any expenditures for additional coverage would waste public
funds.
Unless the facts of a particular case fit within the exceptions to im-
munity mandated by section 537.600, a school district that does not pur-
chase liability insurance retains its immunity from suits in tort. The dear
effect of merely authorizing a "political subdivision" to purchase liability
68. A plaintiff must still establish liability in every state allowing suit against
governmental entities and school districts. This usually consists of proving neg-
ligence and proximate cause, and successfully overcoming any defenses asserted
by the school district. See Morris v. Oritz, 103 Ariz. 119, 121, 437 P.2d 652, 654
(1968) (negligence action by student against school district for injuries sustained
in auto mechanics class); Ford v. Riverside City School Dist., 121 Cal. App. 2d
554, 561-63, 263 P.2d 626, 631 (1953) (negligence against school district for stu-
dent personal injuries from thorn bush). See generally Mancke, supra note 54.
69. See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. § 24-10-114 (Cum. Supp. 1979) ($400,000 for
a single occurrence; $150,000 per person); TEux. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6592-19
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980) ($300,000 for a single occurrence; $100,000 per person).
70. This legislation denies a plaintiff punitive damages. See RSMo § 537.610.3
(1978). The same result obtains under HAWAI REv. STAT. § 662-2 (1976); Tax. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980).
71. RSMo § 537.610.2 (1978). The liability of the state and its publfc en-
tities on claims within the scope of RSMo §§ 537.600-.650 (1978), shall not exceed
these amounts.
72. See Moreno v. Aldrich, 113 So. 2d 406, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(personal injury action against Game Commission). Some courts have held that
it is the governmental unit's responsibility to plead and prove any maximum
limits of liability set forth in statutes. See City of Terre Haute v. Deckard, 243
Ind. 289, 295-96, 183 N.E.2d 815, 818 (1962) (negligence action against a city for
injuries arising out of an automobile accident).
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insurance and thereby waive its sovereign immunity is to discourage the
purchase of such insurance: why buy insurance when its only possible effect
would be to create a liability that did not previously exist?7 3 Alternatively,
if the school district chose to purchase liability insurance pursuant to
section 587.610.1, its immunity from suits is waived only to the amount
of and for the purposes provided in the policy.74 Therefore, the determi-
nation of whether the school district would be liable and to what extent
rests solely in the discretion of the district itself. Recovering under this
section of Missouri's sovereign immunity legislation, consequently depends
upon whether the tortfeasor entity had taken the initiative and purchased
adequate liability insurance.
Other jurisdictions foresaw an injustice in this approach. After con-
sidering a public policy argument that injured persons should be allowed
to recover for the negligent acts or omissions of school districts, many legis-
latures required school districts to procure a specified level of liability in-
surance.75 Since school districts in Missouri are not required to procure
liability insurance, they can safely ignore section 537.610.1, all the time
cognizant of the fact that by doing so they retain their immunity at no
cost or penalty.
One important aspect of Missouri's sovereign immunity legislation is
dear: it is now possible for a school district to incur tort liability and be
required to pay compensatory damages out of its own coffers. This could
result if the plaintiff's injuries occurred within the exceptions to immun-
ity set out in section 537.600 and the school district had not availed itself
of the protection of liability insurance through section 537.610.1. Further,
section 537.600 liability is not limited to the terms of any insurance pur-
chased pursuant to section 537.610.1. Therefore, it would behoove a
school district to purchase liability insurance up to the statutory maximum
recovery for section 537.600 exceptions to immunity.
There are Missouri cases saying that a school district is a political
subdivision, but these cases did not arise under the new sovereign immun-
ity statute.76 There were no Missouri cases holding that a school district
73. One may think that good public relations would require that school dis-
tricts carry liability insurance, especially since they handle our youth on a daily
basis. This argument weakens, however, as soon as a result such as Beiser is al-
lowed. Any good public relations gained from carrying such insurance would be
lost immediately.
74. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
75. For extensive citations of such statutes, see Linn, Tort Liability and the
Schools, 43 N.D.L. Rlv. 765 (1967). The effect of failing to buy liability insur-
ance when required to do so by statute has been to place the political subdivision
in the position of a self-insurer. See Sturdivant v. City of Farmington, 255 Ark.
415, 417-18, 500 S.W.2d 769, 771 (1973) (suit in tort against municipality for re-
sulting death from collision with municipality's agent). Failure to buy this re-
quired insurance may result in individual liability for those who were responsible
for its procurement. See Gilbert v. Harlan County Bd. of Educ., 309 S.W.2d 771,
772 (Ky. 1958) (personal injury action resulting from defendant's employee's
gross negligence in driving truck).
76. See notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra.
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is a municipality. Thus, a plaintiff whose case is factually similar to Beiser
is more apt to prevail under the new sovereign immunity legislation than
he was under section 71.185. The school district would likely be considered
a "political subdivision" of the state and therefore would have waived its
sovereign immunity for the purposes and extent of the insurance it car-
ried. A plaintiff establishing liability would be allowed recovery on this
policy, but recovery would be limited to the amount of the policy. Alter-
natively, if the plaintiff could characterize the shop class as being in a
dangerous condition, then his potential recovery would be limited only by
the statutory ceiling. If the school district did not have liability insurance,
this latter theory would be the only way a plaintiff, injured accidentally,
could seek compensatory recovery.
It is important to note that neither Beiser nor Missouri's sovereign
immunity legislation affected school districts' employees' personal liability
for their negligent acts. 77 There has never been a general principle of law
in Missouri clothing these employees 78 with immunity from liability for
their negligent acts.7 9 Specifically, teachers are obligated to exercise an
ordinary degree of care in supervising their pupils.8 0 It has also been sug-
gested that where student activities are of a more dangerous nature, e.g.,
industrial arts classes, teachers are held to a more exacting standard that
requires the exercise of reasonable care under these hazardous conditions. 81
Therefore, a plaintiff, with facts similar to those in Beiser, may, relying on
this theory, be able to file suit and receive a judgment against the shop
teacher personally.
The rule in Missouri regarding governmental responsibility in tort is
clearly immunity. The statutorily provided exceptions to this rule are
limited, and it is unclear to just what governmental entities they apply.
77. This legislation dealt solely with the governmental entity. For school
employees' liability, see generally 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts §§ 320-321(1952); Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 830 (1971); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1163 (1953).
78. Other states have even produced statutes that accommodate the doctrines
of respondeat superior and sovereign immunity together. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 815.2 (West 1966); HAWAII .EV. STAT. § 662-2 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
59:2-2 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); Omo Rlv. CoDE ANN. § 2743.02 (Page Supp.
1979). See generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Ac-
tions, 77 HAtv. L. Rxv. 209 (1963); Sovereign Immunity in Missouri: The King
Was Dead, Temporarily, 47 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 230 (1978).
79. Kersey v. Harbin, 531 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Mo. App., Spr. 1975) (plaintiffs
brought action against principal, teachers, and nurse of school district for death
of their child in gym). See generally Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 VAND.
L. REv. 723 (1959).
80. Clark v. Furch, 567 S.W.2d 457, 458 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978) (guardian
brought action against teacher for student injured in gym).
81. Courts have allowed negligence actions against the school districts for a
teacher's lack of supervision and instruction regarding activities inherently dang-
erous at school. See Mastrangelo v. West Side Union High School Dist., 2 Cal. 2d
540, 545-46, 42 P.2d 634, 636 (1935) (chemistry class); Matteucd v. High School
Dist. No. 208, 4 Ill. App. 3d 710, 713-14, 281 N.E.2d 383, 386 (1972) (shop class);
Scott v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, - -Minn.-, - 256 N.W.2d
485, 489 (1977) (industrial arts class).
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Beiser suggested that the Missouri Supreme Court may be restrictive in its
interpretation of this legislation. Section 537.610.1 may only place a
moral burden upon a political subdivision by the knowledge that they
could purchase insurance and compensate persons injured as a result of
their negligence. Further, any political subdivision that chooses to meet
this burden may ultimately find that it has wasted its money in purchasing
liability insurance. To remedy these deficiencies the legislature should
amend this statute to clarify exactly what governmental entities are to be
included and excluded from its scope. This could be accomplished by the
addition of a definitional section.82 Unless a definitional section is added,
confusion regarding the scope of section 537.610.1 will remain and there
will be litigation that could easily be avoided if the legislature would take
this simple step. Additionally, the purchase of liability insurance should
be statutorily required. This legislation would then comport with the con-
temporary policy that the public, rather than the victim, should bear the
loss of injuries caused by negligent acts of public employees since the public
is the primary beneficiary of their services. Without such changes, un-
certainty will continue and the usefulness of section 537.610.1 to injuted
persons will be insignificant.
JEFFREY S. BAY
82. Comprehensive sovereign immunity legislation in other states has ex-
pressly provided in definitional sections that school districts are public entities
of the state, COLO. RaV. STAT. § 24-10-103(5) (1973) and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85,
§ 1-206 (Smith-Hurd 1966), or that they are political subdivisions of the state,
Micir. Comp. LAws AN. § 691.1401(b) (1968) and NEB. REv. STAT. § 23-
2402(1) (1977). Because of the definitional sections, there is no question that
school districts are within the scope of those statutes.
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